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FLORIDA AFTER SECESSION: ABANDONMENT
BY THE CONFEDERACY AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
by JOHN F. REIGER*
I N THE EARLY months of 1861, some Florida citizens seemed tofeel that the approaching conflict would be diversion rather
than tragedy. On January 12, the day after the state seceded,
a detachment of Florida and Alabama troops seized the navy
yard at Pensacola. They were accompanied by a jovial throng
of townspeople who found the event greatly entertaining. Other
Floridians believed that the government would not fight to
preserve the Union, or if it did fight, that the efforts would be
cowardly and short. Throughout the state, prominent men
offered to drink all the blood spilt in any struggle with the
North.l
The people of Florida were confident simply because they
believed the new Confederate government was capable of de-
fending their coasts and of protecting their families. As a result,
young men did not hesitate to offer their services to the Con-
federacy once the conflict finally materialized. The first three
troop requisitions Governor Madison Starke Perry received
were quickly filled by enthusiastic volunteers.
Although the Confederate government eagerly called Florida
men into service and sent them north to Virginia, it appeared
reluctant to provide for the military defenses of the state. On
June 1, 1861, the governor telegraphed Leroy P. Walker, the
secretary of war: “We have batteries erected at several points
on the coast, requiring at least two regiments to garrison. If
Florida is to take care of herself, say so.”2
* Mr. Reiger is assistant professor of history, University of Miami.
1. Caroline Mays Brevard, A History of Florida from the Treaty of 1763 to
Our Own Times, edited by James A. Robertson, 2 vols. (Deland, 1925),
II, 51.
2. Madison S. Perry to Leroy P. Walker, June 1, 1861, War of the Rebellion:
A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies (Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. I, I, 469. Hereinafter referred to
as Official Records, Armies.
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The coastal regions of the state were already under, or com-
ing under, Federal domination. Fort Pickens, commanding the
entrance to Pensacola Bay, Fort Taylor at Key West, and Fort
Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas were all in Union hands. The
Federal blockading fleet was being augmented daily, and
Floridians knew that gunboats could easily ascend the Apalachi-
cola and St. Johns rivers, thereby cutting the state into con-
trolled pockets.
Even then, the Confederate war department failed to act.
On October 29 the new governor, John Milton, told the secre-
tary of war, Judah P. Benjamin: “Florida wants arms. She has
never received a musket from the Confederate States . . . . Can
I get some?“3 After waiting three weeks without result, he de-
cided to write Jefferson Davis personally concerning the dismal
situation in Florida:
At all important points, we are threatened with attack; no-
where prepared to meet the enemy; and when, as governor of
the State, I have applied for arms and munitions of war, I
have been . . . [told that] a requisition should be made by
the officer in command of the military department, yet none
is in command. . . . We need troops and munitions of war,
and officers of military education, experience, and ability,
and, if not promptly aided, Florida may be lost to the
Southern Confederacy. Her citizens have almost despaired
of protection from the Confederate Government.4
At this time, General Robert E. Lee was inspecting the de-
fenses of Fernandina and Amelia Island. He found conditions
there “poor indeed,” and expressed the “hope that our enemy
will be polite enough to wait for US.“5 Military leaders from
other parts of Florida reported similar conditions. General Brax-
ton Bragg, commander at Pensacola, angrily protested that all
3. John Milton to Judah P. Benjamin, October 29, 1861, ibid., Ser. 1, VI,
299; Benjamin had replaced Walker as secretary of war on September
19, 1861
4. Milton to Jefferson Davis, November 19, 1861, ibid., Ser. I, VI, 325.
5. Robert E. Lee to Annie and Agnes Lee, November 22, 1861, in Clifford
Dowdey and Louis H. Manarin, eds., The Wartime Papers of R.E. Lee
(Boston 1961), 89.
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his men and arms were being sent north to Virginia: “It is a de-
pleting process I cannot stand.“6
Even before hostilities actually began, inhabitants of coastal
towns and interior regions easily reached from the sea expressed
anxiety about the vulnerability of their areas. The situation in
Apalachicola was typical. On April 3, 1861, a committee of four
of the town’s leading citizens pleaded with the secretary of war
for “means to repel aggressions from . . . [our] seaboard.“7 Be-
cause the townspeople believed they had been deserted by their
government, it was only natural that when Apalachicola was oc-
cupied by the Federals a year later, they manifested indiffer-
ence, even hostility, toward the Confederacy and its goals. When
Commander Henry S. Stellwagen of the United States navy landed
at the town and had an interview with its inhabitants, he was
told that they “have had no part in it [the rebellion]. The inno-
cent suffer with the guilty.” Stellwagen thought that if force
was not used on the people of Apalachicola, they “would be in
favor of the Union.“8
Two events, one within the state and the other without, left
Florida inadequately defended in early 1862. The first was the
ill-conceived action taken by the Convention of the People of
Florida which met in Tallahassee on January 14. Because at this
point in the war, the future of the Confederacy still looked
bright, and because the majority of the delegates believed that
the central government would eventually get around to protect-
ing Florida, it was decided to abolish the state militia, effective
March 10.9 The delegates thought this action would be popular
because it would mean lower taxes. Many Floridians, however,
were more concerned with their protection than their pocket-
books. The Tallahassee Florida Sentinel reported that while
the convention was in session, a large segment of the public felt
a “restless anxiety” over its deliberations, and some even re-
quested its adjournment.10
6. Braxton Bragg to Adjutant-General, C.S. Army, November 29, 1861,
Official Records, Armies, Ser. I, VI, 772.
7. B. F. Simmons, S. W. Spencer, J. J. Griffin, and J. L. Dunham to
Walker, ibid., Ser. I, 1, 456.
8. Henry S. Stellwagen to Wm. W. McKean, April 4, 1862, Official Records,
of  the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of  the Rebellion
(Washington, 1894-1922), Ser. I, XVII, 203-04. Hereinafter referred to
as Official Records, Navies.
9. John E. Johns, Florida During the Civil War (Gainesville, 1963), 114.
10. Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, January 28, 1362.
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The second event, or series of events, that left Florida
almost completely defenseless was the Confederate setback in
Tennessee. Grant’s advance against the southern strongholds
on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers had been successful, and
unless he was stopped, and soon, Mississippi and Alabama would
fall under Union control. As a result, Florida troops were ordered
north in an attempt to buck up sagging defenses. Bragg was
told to withdraw all his men from Pensacola and Mobile.
Similarly, Brigadier General J. H. Trapier, commander at Talla-
hassee, was directed in early March to transfer his regiment to
Tennessee, leaving in Florida only those troops “necessary to
defend [the] Apalachicola River, by which the enemy’s gunboats
may penetrate far into the State of Georgia.“11
These developments embittered Governor John Milton. In a
letter to the secretary of war he complained that “the effect of
the order [moving Confederate forces out of Florida] is to aband-
on Middle, East, and South Florida to the mercy or abuse of
the Lincoln Government. . . . I cannot . . . believe that an order
to have that effect would have been issued without previous
notice to the executive of the State, that proper measures might
have been advised for the protection of the lives, liberty, and
property of the citizens of . . . Florida.“12
The people of Florida felt forsaken. Brigadier General Sam-
uel Jones, in charge of the evacuation of Pensacola, reported
to General Braxton Bragg that because of the order to remove
Confederate troops northward, “the people of Pensacola and
Mobile and all Alabama and West Florida . . . are greatly
alarmed.“13
Those in east Florida became increasingly apathetic toward
the Confederacy and its war aims and began to accept the idea
of being occupied, sooner or later, by Federal forces. Mayor H.
H. Hoeg of Jacksonville, for example, advised his fellow citizens
that “Inasmuch as all the Confederate troops, arms, and muni-
tions of war upon the St. John’s River and in east and south
Florida generally are ordered away, and that the east and south
are to be abandoned, it is useless to attempt a defense of the
11. Lee to J. H. Trapier, March 1, 1862, Official Records, Armies, Ser. I, VI,
403.
12. Milton to Benjamin, March 5, 1862, ibid., 402.
13. Samuel Jones to Bragg, March 6, 1862, ibid., 841.
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city . . . and, therefore, upon approach of the enemy, it should
be surrendered.“14
By the middle of March 1862, the towns of Florida’s east
coast were in Federal hands; Apalachicola had been visited by
Yankee troops; Pensacola was being evacuated; and practically
all Confederate forces had already left, or were in the process
of leaving, for the North. With Fernandina, Jacksonville, St.
Augustine, Apalachicola, Pensacola, and Key West in Federal
control, or unable co defend themselves if the Federals were to
move even a small force against them— “all Middle Florida is
seized with panic,” a resident of the region exclaimed, for “we
can now be approached from the east, south, and west.“15
Throughout 1862, the military situation in Florida continued
to deteriorate, especially in the coastal regions. Now, a new
menace arose-slave rebellion. Amidst a total free population
of 78,679 lived 50,566 slaves, with 26,247 in middle Florida,
16,202 in east and south Florida, and 8,117 in west Florida.16
With many of the men gone, some Floridians believed that a
black insurrection was a real possibility.
Because of the reluctance or inability of the Confederate
government to supply Florida with the necessary arms to defend
herself, Governor Milton requested the people to donate their
private weapons, especially shotguns. He encountered difficulty,
however, in obtaining these arms, because many slaveholders
wanted to retain them in case of rebellion.17 In a letter to
President Davis, written in October 1862, Milton summed up
conditions in Florida:
Disaster after disaster has occurred, until the State is ex-
posed to and threatened with immediate subjugation, and
many of our citizens have become indignant and almost
reckless as to the fearful results. How could it be otherwise,
when they know that from the want of proper exertions to
14. Proclamation of H. H. Hoeg to his “FELLOW CITIZENS,” March 7,
1862, Official Records, Navies, Ser. 1, XII, 600.
15. Ellen Call Long, Florida Breezes; or, Florida, New and Old (Jackson-
ville, 1883; facsimile edition, Gainesville, 1962), 339.
16. Milton to Davis, October 10, 1862, Official Records, Armies, Ser. I,
LIII, 260.
17. Milton to Trapier, February 22, 1862, John Milton Papers, Florida
Historical Society Collection, University of South Florida Library,
Tampa. Hereinafter referred to as Milton Papers.
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prevent it the wives and children of many of our brave
soldiers who are in Virginia and Kentucky have been captured
and taken off from the State. . . .18 In view of threatened
invasion and the rapidly approaching destruction of the
State . . ., I do appeal to you for forces and munitions of
war to defend the State . . . from the loss of . . . property,
and possibly greater loss from servile insurrection.19
Another factor that added much to the worsening situation
was the Federal blockade. This attempt to starve the South into
submission caused widespread want in Florida and, in some
cases, near starvation. As the war went on, the United States
navy increasingly took advantage of the Confederacy’s lack of
interest in defending the state’s coasts and inland waterways.
Beginning in 1862, gunboats began raiding towns along the
Apalachicola and St. Johns,20 gradually gaining control of east,
south, and west Florida, as well as the coastal regions. From
that year on, only middle Florida was reasonably safe from
Federal occupation and able to continue as an integral part of
the Confederacy. Because it remained largely free from occupa-
tion throughout the war, only this region continued its faith in
Confederate and state officials.
By the summer of 1862, much of the earlier enthusiasm for
the Confederacy had been dissipated by the realities of war and
blockade. A large part of Florida was either permanently occu-
pied, sporadically occupied, or completely defenseless; the Fed-
eral blockade was successful in causing widespread suffering; and
the earlier glow of southern victories was flickering out in one
military disaster after another. 21 Apathy was now commonplace.
On June 21, 1862, the Gainesville Cotton States suggested that
because of the extensive indifference to the war effort, “more
especially should we urge the importance of the matter to the
people of this state.” Governor Milton despaired that great
18. Actually, most of these “captives” were refugees who willingly entered
the Federal lines.
19. Milton to Davis, October 10, 1862, Official Records, Armies, Ser. I,
LIII, 260-61.
20. Long, Florida Breezes, 363.
21. For example, the fall of Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and
a few days later, Fort Donelson on the Cumberland (February 1862);
the setback at Antietam (September 17, 1862); the capture of New
Orleans and Vicksburg by July 1863; and the crucial defeat at Gettys-
burg (July 1-3, 1863).
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efforts are “necessary to enlighten the minds of citizens near the
coast and other portions of the State . . . [in order] to overcome
the repugnance to military service and create a spirit of patriot-
ism.“22
Although editors did their best to allay apathy and replace
i with patriotism, their efforts were in vain. In July 1863, the
Tallahassee Florida Sentinel bemoaned the lack of enthusiasm
among the state’s inhabitants for carrying the war to a successful
conclusion: “We can’t force the people to organize . . . . If . . .
[they] refuse to take the necessary steps to enable them to aid
the regular forces in the state to repel invasion and defend
their homes and families from destruction and degradation,
the Lord have mercy on them!“23
Six days after this editorial appeared, Governor Milton in-
formed the secretary of war that the latter’s requisition for 1,500
men would be impossible to fill, “unless they should volunteer
freely, . . . which I have much reason to believe they will not
do.“24 By this time, many Floridians seemed receptive to the
idea of having their “nation” rejoin the Union. Those known
to be in favor of the United States government— like those of
similar views in other southern states— were dubbed “Union
men” by loyal Confederates. In Septembser 1862, Governor Milton
noted in a communication to President Davis: “You are apprised
that in Florida a very large minority were opposed to secession,
and in many parts of the State combinations existed to adhere
to and maintain the United States Government, and even now
in some portions of the State there are men who would eagerly
seize any opportunity that promised success to the United
States.“25
For obvious reasons, pro-Union sentiment was always most
evident in areas occupied or easily penetrated by Federal forces.
Sometimes, however, citizens in these regions had to be “per-
suaded” to return to their allegiance to the United States. Most
of the inhabitants of the naval base of Key West fell into this
category. Although the island had never been out of Federal
hands, in the early days after secession, a clear majority of, its
22. Milton to James A. Seddon, December 6, 1862, Milton Papers.
23. Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, July 14, 1863.
24. Milton to Seddon, July 20, 1863, Official Records, Armies, Ser. IV. II,
649.
25. Milton to Davis, September 23, 1862, ibid., 92.
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citizens were pro-Confederate. When Florida seceded, all Federal
civil officials except the collector of customs and the district
judge, William Marvin, resigned their posts.26 Two months
later, even with the United States navy in the vicinity, most in-
habitants of Key West were still reticent about accepting the
fait accompli of Federal domination. The commander at Fort
Taylor, Captain John M. Brannan, reported to his superior that
“flags of the Southern Confederacy have been raised upon the
stores of various citizens.” He doubted that “any resident of Key
West will be allowed to hold office under the Federal Govern-
ment unless supported by the military and naval forces.“27
In spite of this pro-Confederate sentiment, or perhaps because
of it, certain factors soon came into play that successfully caused
most of the citizens either to favor unequivocally the Union
cause, or at least to accept the United States as the rightful
authority. Judge Marvin and his followers worked diligently to
destroy Confederate sentiment and to make “the general policy
of the [Federal] Government” acceptable to a majority of the
island’s citizens.28 By April 1861, a Federal officer reported that
Marvin’s influence was proving effective in “eradicating the
treasonable spirit which has lately had full . . . sway here.“29
The efforts of the Union men were aided by the strong actions
of the new United States commmander of the island, Major
William II. French. In early May he forbade, under the threat
of heavy penalties, the display of Confederate flags. He also
disbanded the “Island Guards,” a pro-Confederate paramilitary
organization, suppressed the local secessionist newspaper, Key
of the Gulf, putting its editor “under military surveillance,”
and suspended the writ of habeas corpus. These actions, he
thought, had “given universal satisfaction to the Union-loving
citizens, besides others whose interests are compromised by the
acts of secessionists.“30
Because of French’s disciplined rule, the editor of the Key
26. New York Times, March 13, 1862, quoted in William Watson Davis,
The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida (New York, 1913; fac-
simile edition, Gainesville, 1964), 247.
27. John M. Brannan to Lorenzo Thomas, March 13, 1861, Official Records,
Armies, Ser. I, I, 360.
28. Montgomery C. Meigs to William H. Seward, April 13, 1861, ibid., 374.
29. Ibid.
30. William H. French to George L. Hartsuff, May 8, 1861, ibid., 411-12.
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of the Gulf and quite a few others of Confederate sentiment left
the island. A newspaper with the appropriate title of the New
Era replaced the secessionist sheet. The new periodical was a
powerful force in generating pro-Union feeling. Its announced
editorial policy was “the abolition of slavery, defeat of the
Confederacy, but not in the subjugation of the South, and the
Union.“31 The New Era, therefore, was pro-Union but not vin-
dictively anti-southern. Support for the United States, exhibited
by a large minority of the island’s inhabitants, went further than
just talk: “106 of the most respectable citizens at Key West,”
who, believing that they could “assist in preserving the honor
of our flag, upholding the laws, and quelling rebellion,” formed
themselves into a volunteer company and offered their services
to the Union commander.32
On the island a pattern emerged that appeared in other
regions dominated by Federal forces. This was a rather suspici-
ous transformation of ardent secessionists, under the surveill-
ance of the United States military, into Union-loving citizens—
a process that often took place overnight. On his arrival in Key
West, French had found a clear majority of the islanders seces-
sionist, but after Federal occupation was firmly established, many
of these same citizens suddenly “became very loud and offensive
in their so-called loyalty to the Union.“33 Key West was unique
only because United States forces occupied it continuously
throughout the war. Most of the larger towns of the state
were on the coast or in areas easily reached by Federal gun-
boats. Thus, these regions increasingly came under Union mili-
tary control and Union influence.
The second most important naval base in Florida was Pensa-
cola. Shortly before hostilities broke out, Confederate officials in
the vicinity of the town began having trouble with individuals
who continued to furnish United States forces fuel, water, and
provisions as though secession had never occurred. To clarify the
situation to these people, headquarters issued an order prohibit-
ing “all intercourse with Santa Rosa Island, Fort Pickens, or the
United States fleet.“34 Despite this, the people of west Florida con-
31. Key West New Era, August 16, 1862.
32. French to Hartsuff, May 20, 1861, Official Records, Armies, Ser. 1, I, 426.
33. Jefferson Beale Browne, Key West, The Old and the New (St. Augus-
tine, 1912), 92.
34. Official Records, Armies, Ser. I, I, 464.
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tinued to manifest their contempt for the Confederacy by ignor-
ing all its military regulations. The situation became so bad that
in March 1862, the Confederate commander declared martial
law in the city and issued a circular announcing that “The
gallows is erected in Pensacola, and will be in constant use on
and after the third of April, 1862.“35 Because Confederate
forces defending Pensacola were needed elsewhere, the city was
evacuated on May 9.36 When, on the following day, a Federal
officer demanded an unconditional surrender, 150 persons, “with
but one . . . exception, manifested unbounded joy at the arrival
of a representative of the United States authority.“37 When the
Stars and Stripes rose over the city, many citizens cheered, and
Mayor Brosenham was deemed “zealous and apparently loyal.“38
By late 1863, the population of Florida west of the Apalachi-
cola River was seething with pro-Union ferment. On October 15
Governor Milton wrote General Pierre G.T. Beauregard: “A
very large proportion, if not a majority, of the citizens left in
West Florida are represented to be disloyal— at all events, advo-
cate reconstruction . . . . Should the enemy occupy Apalachicola,
I do not hesitate to express the opinion that, co-operating with
tories and deserters and the negroes that would go to them,
they would not require a large force to lay waste, if not sub-
jugate and occupy, all of Florida west of the Apalachicola
River.“39
Like south and west Florida, east Florida too had its share
of Union men. Soon after hostilities began, loyal Confederates
expressed concern over the large number of Unionists known to
be living in Jacksonville and vicinity. A letter appearing in the
St. Augustine Examiner discussed this problem and suggested
that an oath of allegiance to the Confederacy should be required
of all males above the age of sixteen. Anyone refusing to take
35. Proclamation of Colonel Thomas M. Jones, March 30, 1862, in Frank
Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, with
Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, etc., 11 vols. (New
York, 1861-1868), IV, 72.
36. Thomas M. Jones to John H. Forney, May 14, 1862, Official Records,
Armies, Ser. I, VI, 660-62.
37. Moore, The Rebellion Record, V, 49.
38. L. G. Arnold to Charles G. Halpine, May 15, 1862, Official Records,
Armies, Ser. I, VI, 659.
39. Milton to Pierre G. T. Beauregard, October 15, 1863, ibid., Ser. I,
XXVIII, Pt. 2, 452.
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the oath would be requested to leave the state, because “He
who is not for us is against us.”40
The fears expressed in the letter were confirmed when Jack-
sonville was occupied by Federal forces in March 1862. Lieuten-
ant T. H. Stevens, commander of the United States troops, found
that “the inhabitants are seeking and waiting for the protection
of our flag; they do not fear us, but their own people, and from
the occupation of this important point I am satisfied, if our
opportunities are improved, great results will follow.“41 The
Union men of Jacksonville, believing that it was now safe to
reveal their affection for the United States, held a rally in the
town square.42 With C. L. Robinson, a local entrepreneur and
a well known Republican, as their chairman, they drew up a
resolution which held that “government is a contract, in which
protection is the price of allegiance,” that “no State of the
United States has any legal or constitutional right to separate
itself from the government and jurisdiction of the Unites States,”
that “the ordinance of secession . . . is void,” and that “the State
of Florida is an integral part of the United States.“43 The pro-
clamation was presented to the Federal commander, who was
requested “to retain at this place a sufficient force to maintain
order and protect the people in their persons and property.“44
This last request went unfulfilled, for in early April it was
learned that the Federals planned to abandon the town. The
Unionists were hysterical for they knew that when the Con-
federates returned their property, and perhaps their lives would
be in grave danger. They pleaded with the Federal commander
to allow them to accompany the expedition to Fernandina, and
he agreed.45 With all the belongings they could carry, they
hurried down to the wharfs, “each carrying some article too
precious to forsake. Books, boxes, valises, portraits, pictures,
packages of clothing, pet canaries and mocking birds were most
frequently seen. Stout-hearted and stylish officers, relieving Din-
ahs of their little charges, and leading two, three, and four-year-
40. St. Augustine Examiner, June 22, 1861.
41. T. H. Stevens to Samuel F. DuPont, March 13, 1862, Official Records,
Navies, Ser. I, XII, 600.
42. New York Times, April 2, 1862.
43. Official Records, Armies, Ser. I, VI, 25152.
44. Ibid., 252.
45. H. G. Wright to A. B. Ely, April 13, 1862, ibid., 125.
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olds along the docks, added a humane and praiseworthy lu-
dicrousness to the melancholy scene.”‘46
A very large percentage of the population of other cities in
east Florida was also Unionist in spirit. When the Federals
entered St. Augustine in March 1862, they “were received with
open arms by the town authorities and citizens, and by the
hands of the latter, the Stars and Stripes were raised over Fort
Marion.“47 Only twenty per cent of the city’s inhabitants fled
at the Federal approach.48
In the outlying areas of east Florida, Union men were also
present in great numbers. In April Governor Milton was in-
formed that “the country bordering the Saint John’s River is in-
fested by numerous and dangerous traitors.“49 During the same
month, the New York Times reported that “the triangle formed
by Fernandina, Baldwin and Jacksonville is said to be especially
full of loyal people.“50 After two more years of defeat, suffering,
and occupation, a Federal officer could categorically state that
“the people on the east side of the St. John’s are called Florida
Yankees and the majority of them are Union men.”51
Beginning in late 1863, the Union cause in Florida acquired
a new dimension. The presidential election was approaching
and the Republican party, which was split into two factions—
one that wanted a conciliatory policy toward a defeated South
and the other that demanded a rigorous program of reconstruc-
tion— was searching for a candidate. The two most often men-
tioned were the incumbent, Abraham Lincoln, and his secretary
of the treasury, Salmon Portland Chase. The latter, for reasons
of principle, believed that radical policies were indispensible for
winning the war. One thing that would aid him in this quest
would be a southern state ready to rejoin the Union under his
leadership.
Because of numerous reports coming out of Florida of a
46. Moore, The Rebellion Record, IV, 443.
47. New York Daily Tribune, March 20, 1862.
48. C. R. P. Rodgers to DuPont, March 12, 1862, Official Records, Navies,
Ser. I, XII, 596.
49. R. F. Floyd to Milton, April 11, 1862, Official Records, Armies, Ser. I,
LIII. 233.
50. New York Times, April 2, 1862.
51. John C. Gray, Jr., to John C. Ropes, May 27, 1864, in John Chipman
Gray and John Codman Ropes, War Letters, 1862-1865 (Cambridge,
1927), 342.
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sizable proportion of the citizenry ready to reconstruct a loyal
state government,52 both Chase and Lincoln decided to send
agents to Florida to help the people in reconstruction and, at
the same time, to build political support for themselves. The
two candidates and their agents hoped that Florida would be
reconstructed in time to send delegates to the Republican
National Convention in Baltimore in June 1864.
Chase’s agents were Lyman D. Stickney and Homer G. Plantz;
Lincoln’s was John Hay, his secretary. Plantz, Chase’s private
secretary,53 was sent to Key West as Federal district attorney.
After being on the island for eleven days, he informed Chase
that “the first thing which struck me in my contact with the
people was the absence of all manifestations of National or even
State feeling. Political apathy prevails.” With his goal of political
reconstruction, Plantz was frustrated to find that “what every-
body wants is to be let alone; not to be required to take sides on
any questions; and, better and chiefly, not to have any questions
to take sides about.“54
The apathy that prevailed in Key West was evident in other
parts of Florida as well. John Hay, while working in east Florida
a few months later, also encountered it. When he posted copies
of Lincoln’s Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction55 in
Jacksonville in February 1864, a “few citizens gathered around
. . . with something that looked like a ghost of an interest.“56 At






New York Times, April 2, 1862, declared: “the loyal sentiment is found
to exist in all its purity and fervor”; also ibid., April 1, 1862, February
4, 1863.
The activities and experiences of these men are important to our dis-
cussion only in so far as they help reveal the presence of Union
feeling in Confederate Florida. Because Stickney’s reports were some-
times intentionally exaggerated for the benefit of the secretary of the
treasury, they are not utilized.
Homer G. Plantz to Salmon P. Chase, December 1, 1863, Selected
Letters of Salmon P. Chase, 1834-1867, microfilm copy, P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History, University of Florida, Gainesville.
Issued December 8, 1863, the proclamation offered a pardon to all south-
erners who would take an oath of allegiance, and it provided for re-
storation of loyal governments in seceded states when a number equal
to one-tenth of those qualified to vote in a state in 1860 “shall take a
prescribed oath” and organize a government.
Diary entry, February 10, 1864, in John Hay, Lincoln and the Civil War
in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay, Selected and With an Introduc-
tion by Tyler Dennett (New York, 1939), 159.
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apathy could be transformed into hostility for the Confederacy
and, finally, support for the Union.
On February 11 Hay went to the Jacksonville guardhouse
and recited the proclamation to Confederate army prisoners
confined there.57 After reading the notice, he retired to an office
supplied for the purpose of signing up prisoners:
They soon came, a dirty, dirty swarm of grey coats & filed
into the room, escorted by a negro guard. Fate had done its
worst for the poor devils. Even a nigger guard didn’t seem
to excite a feeling of resentment. They stood for a moment
in awkward attitudes along the wall. . . . But I soon found
they had come up in good earnest to sign their names. They
opened . . . in a chorus of questions which I answered as I
could. At last a big good–natured fellow said, “There’s ques-
tions enough. Let’s take the oath.” They all stood up in
line & held up their hands while I read the oath.58
From his success in Jacksonville, Hay was optimistic about
the possibility of reconstructing the state under Lincoln’s ten
per cent plan:
The fact that more than 50 per cent of the prisoners of war
were eager to desert & get out of the service shows how
the spirit of the common people is broken. Everybody seemed
tired of the war. Peace on any terms was what they wanted.
They have no care for the political questions involved. Most
of them had not read the oath & when I insisted on their
learning what it was, they would say listlessly, “Yes, I guess
I’ll take it.” Some of the more intelligent cursed their poli-
ticians & especially South Carolina, but most looked hope-
fully to the prospect of having a government to protect
them after the anarchy of the few years past.59
Hay’s exertions in favor of Lincoln, along with the “Pomeroy
Circular”6o and Union victories under the supreme leadership of
57. Diary entry, February 11, 1864, ibid., 160.
58. Ibid., 161.
59. Diary entry, February 12, 1864, ibid., 161-62.
60. Distributed by a group of congressmen under the direction of Senator
S. C. Pomeroy of Kansas, the paper flatly declared Lincoln’s leadership
a failure and proposed Chase for the nomination. When its contents
became public, the circular caused Chase great embarrassment.
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the President, all helped defeat the Chase faction in Florida.
But while Hay might have been successful in frustrating the
Chase backers, he labored in vain to reconstruct the state. Opti-
mistic in mid-February, two weeks later he was “very sure that
we cannot now get the President’s 10th.“61 In late March he
returned to Washington, his mission a failure.62 What had de-
stroyed Hay’s hopes for reconstructing Florida was the Rattle
of Olustee. Three miles east of Lake City on the afternoon of
February 20, 1864, two small armies, each composed of approxi-
mately 5,500 men, met in desperate conflict. The fight continued
until darkness and ended in an overwhelming Confederate
victory.63
According to Major General Quincy A. Gillmore, Federal
commander of the Department of the South, the purpose of the
Union advance into middle Florida was fourfold: (1) “To pro-
cure an outlet for cotton, lumber, timber, turpentine, and other
products”; (2) “To cut off one of the enemy’s sources of com-
missary supplies”; (3) “To obtain recruits for my colored regi-
ments”; and (4) “To inaugurate measures for the speedy re-
storation of Florida to her allegiance, in accordance with in-
structions which I have received from the President by the hands
of . . . John Hay.“64 Thus, Hay had worked in Jacksonville
with knowledge that the advance of United States forces into
middle Florida was an integral part of the total plan to recon-
struct the state. The disaster at Olustee compelled the Union
army to confine its activities to east Florida, thereby making it
impossible for Hay to enter most regions of the state in order
to obtain the required ten per cent of the 1860 voters. Olustee
also resulted in a temporary boost in the sagging morale of
Confederate Florida. It would take months of worsening priva-
tion and successive Federal victories to return Florida to its
pre-Olustee level of Unionist sentiment.
61. Diary entry, March 1, 1864, Hay, Lincoln and the Civil War, 165.
62. Ibid., March 24, 1864, 166.
63. Official Records, Armies, Ser. I, XXXV, Pt. 1, 298, 337.
64. Quincy A. Gillmore to Henry W. Halleck., January 31, 1864, ibid., 279.
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